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Abstract
Whether the transfer of ownership rights to the private sector leads to a decline or
increase in wage growth is theoretically ambiguous, given that the outcome depends on
the uncertain interaction between firms and workers. Using propensity matching tech-
niques, this paper investigates the eﬀects of privatisation on wages in the Portuguese
banking industry. The empirical results, obtained from Quadros de Pessoal for the pe-
riod between 1989 and 1997, generally show a negative (positive) short-run (long-run)
eﬀect of privatisation on relative wage growth for both men and women retained in the
privatised firms. Moreover, the results show that the most educated and experienced
(oldest) workers, as well as those in the high skill occupational categories, were more
likely to experience a negative wage eﬀect.
Keywords: Privatisation, Wages, Portuguese banking industry, Propensity match-
ing estimators.
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1 Introduction
Despite the large and prolific literature on privatisation, the analysis of the causal eﬀect of
privatisation on wages remains fairly neglected.1 This is somewhat surprising, since the trans-
fer of ownership rights to the private sector has been perhaps the most important structural
reform, introduced worldwide, in the increasing use of markets to allocate resources.2 More
importantly, its implementation has frequently been met with fierce resistance from both
labour unions and local communities, and has attracted intensive press attention. Whilst
policy-makers tend to advocate gains in terms of firms’ internal eﬃciency and profitability,
labour unions fear adverse workforce adjustments, including either displacement of jobs or
reductions in pensions or wages, as a result of the restructuring process. Perhaps the relative
lack of empirical research on this controversial topic merely reflects the unavailability of ap-
propriate data. Typical research on privatisation uses data from firms’ annual accountancy
reports, which, at best, contain crude labour force information.
At the theoretical level, the relationship between privatisation and labour market out-
comes is not obvious; privatisation does not necessarily cut jobs or lower wages. Employment
and wages may decline as privatisation implies a shift in the public firms’ objective func-
tion towards profit maximisation, which aﬀects the outcome of wage bargaining (Haskel and
Szymansky 1992, 1993). However, if workers are willing to put in more eﬀort after privati-
sation, then firms may settle for higher wages (see, e.g., Goerke, 1998, De Fraja, 1993, and
Haskel and Sanchis, 1995). Similarly, if new ownership brings fresh capital and expertise,
such changes are likely to generate growth and job creation.
The present paper contributes to this discussion by impl menting a variety of increasingly
popular non-experimental methods, labelled propensity matching estimators, to assess the
impact of privatisation on wages. In particular, this study re-visits the eﬀects of privatisation
in the Portuguese banking industry, where the already accomplished reform is considered a
“valuable experience for other countries”, since “the main reform objectives were met” with-
out “the concomitant financial instability experienced by many OECD countries”(OECD,
1999, page 64). In this way, this study also contributes to the long-standing debate in the
literature, until now almost exclusively confined to the evaluation of active labour market
policies, over whether treatment eﬀects in observational studies can be reliably evaluated
1Some notable exceptions include Brainerd (2002), Haskel and Szymansky (1993), Ho et al. (2002),
La Porta and Silanes (1999), Monteiro (2004), Parker and Martin (1996) and Peoples and Talley (2001).
Megginson and Netter (2001) survey the empirical literature on privatisation.
2Megginson et al. (1994) provide an excellent historical overview of postwar privatisations in developed
countries. For a study of privatisation eﬀects in a large number of developing countries, see Al-Obaidan
(2002).
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without a randomised experiment.
The present study is empirically fruitful for several reasons. First, apart from the re-
markable success of the above mentioned policy in the banking sector, the design of the
privatisation program in this industry provides a promising opportunity for examining the
eﬀects of a change in ownership. Indeed, not only did privatisation not aﬀect all public
firms (there is still a large state-owned group), but it was also implemented continuously
over eight years. Hence, this partial and ongoing privatisation design permits us to pair
individuals both in the same labour market and with common public employment status.
Therefore, we avoid the potential bias resulting from labour market mismatch (Heckman et
al., 1998) commonly observed in observational studies, and the self-selection bias inherent
in the classical model of Heckman (1979) in the context of private and public sectors.
Second, the adoption of propensity matching estimators is also economically appealing
for analysing the impacts of privatisation. In fact, as privatisation is likely to cause dispro-
portionate changes in the composition of the workforce in privatised firms (compared with
public firms), we would prefer a strategy that is robust to this unequal employment com-
position variation. By pairing each program participant, according to observable attributes,
with members of a comparison (non-treated) group, matching leads — in principle — to ex-
post re-establishment of the conditions of an experiment. Therefore, this eﬀect is naturally
controlled for. Besides, matching is a flexible approach that avoids definition of a specific
form for either the outcome equation, decision process or the unobservable term.
Furthermore, this class of estimators is also appropriate to appraise the eﬀects of the
reform over both the short and long run. Indeed, the original cross-section pairwise matching
estimators have been recently extended not only to new multiple matching schemes, but also
to the case of repeated cross-sectional or longitudinal data. These new modified versions,
which will be described below, are less restrictive in assumptions and can thus produce
more accurate estimates.3 The original matching assumptions are well suitable for short-run
eﬀects of treatment, whereas these new extensions are likely to become more plausible as we
attempt to pick up more persistent medium-/long-term eﬀects of privatisation.
Finally, this class of estimators has heavy data requirements since the quality of match-
ing estimates mirrors the quality/quantity of the variables employed. This paper uses data
from a large dataset, Quadros de Pessoal, collected by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour
and Solidarity. This extensive matched employer-employee database provides detailed infor-
mation about each unit, firm or individual, during the period before and after privatisation.
3For details, see the original papers of Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a) or the discussions in, e.g., Smith
and Todd (2005) and Blundell and Dias (2000).
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Hence, it allows us to draw samples of diﬀerent nature (cross-section and longitudinal) and
implement the entire class of matching estimators. Moreover, as all treated and control units
respond to the same mandatory employer report, there is no bias resulting from diﬀerences
in survey questionnaires (Heckman et al., 1998).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly the main features
of the privatisation process and the labour relations prevailing in the Portuguese banking
sector. Section 3 presents an overview of the assumptions and variety of the matching
estimators. The data implementation issues are addressed in Section 4. Section 5 outlines
and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 closes the paper, summarising the main lessons
of this study.
2 Privatisation and the Portuguese banking labour market
The privatisation program was introduced in the banking sector as a further step in the
successful reform of the Portuguese financial system (OECD, 1999). This structural reform,
starting in 1984, aimed to put an end to the heavily regulated and nationalised system im-
posed in the industry after the 25th April 1974 revolution. Less than one decade afterwards,
when most of the deregulation reforms were already accomplished, including the dismantle-
ment of the interest rate controls and the openness of the financial intermediation to the
private sector, the privatisation program was then implemented.
The first privatisation law adopted in 1988 (law 84/88 from 20th July) allowed merely
partial privatisation of public enterprises as the state still retained 51 per cent of the equity.
For this first phase of privatisation, the government selected four profitable firms, which
included one medium size bank. In April 1990, after a second Constitutional Amendment laid
down in June 1989, the lei Quadro das Privatizações, (decree-law 11/90 from 5thApril) was
passed, allowing full privatisation of enterprises nationalised after 1974. The privatisation
program was assumed to be an important mechanism for (1) improving the deteriorated
performance of public economic units, (2) modernising and increasing their competitiveness
and (3) widening the participation of Portuguese citizens in the ownership of enterprises,
particularly among workers and small shareholders.4
The firms being privatised were first transformed into corporations, with a prior evalua-
tion being made by two independent entities. However, in contrast with some other economic
sectors (e.g., electricity and telecommunications), the government opted for a policy of no
interference in the public firms during the period before privatisation (Naumann, 1995, and
4Sousa and Cruz (1995) describe and discuss the economic and financial situation of public enterprises.
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Sousa and Cruz, 1995), leaving the economic restructuring for future private owners. In
terms of scheduled order of privatisation, apart from those firms which were selected on
grounds of performance indicators for the partial privatisation phase (OECD, 1989), there
was no set schedule for subsequent firms’ privatisation (OECD, 1991). Instead, the timetable
was strongly aﬀected by the economic and political domestic cycles, and by the international
context.
By mid-1997, ten out of twelve public banks became fully private: two banks were pri-
vatised in 1991, three in 1994, and each of the five remaining banks were privatised in 1989,
1990, 1992, 1993 and 1996, respectively.5 ,6 The most common privatisation procedure used,
was public oﬀer, and, to a much lesser extent, direct sale or public tender. The broad-
ening share-ownership goal clearly desired by the authorities was not achieved; instead, a
managerial-dominant type of ownership emerged (although the employees had the right to
subscribe to some part of the capital of the privatised firm at preferential rates). In most
cases, ownership returned to former Portuguese groups, which owned them prior to the na-
tionalisation wave in 1974.7 Due to this private-public-private ownership path, privatisation
in Portugal is termed re-privatisation.
As a result of the divestiture reform, significant improvements in terms of productivity
and eﬃciency levels were registered in the Portuguese banking industry. For instance, the
OECD 1999 survey, referring to the commercial banking industry, reports a continuous
increase in the productivity level (balance sheet total per employee), which allowed not only
a reduction in operating/staﬀ costs (from 1.53 per cent of average assets in 1991 to 0.98
percent in 1997), but also a remarkable improvement in the profitability rate (return to
equity) after 1995. This global rise in the eﬃciency level of the industry is also confirmed by
Pinho (1999), who nevertheless attests to an increase that is particularly more pronounced
among privatised institutions.8
The developments at the ownership level conditioned the type of industrial labour re-
lations prevailing in the industry, which are unique to Portugal. Covering three diﬀerent
geographical areas, the oldest labour unions in the mainland represent all employees in the
bargaining process, regardless the ownership of the bank. Indeed, trade unions and a group
5This total number (ten) of firms privatised in the banking industry does not coincide with the eleven
privatised firms reported by the OECD 1999 survey, due to the absence of one bank in the data.
6According to the privatisation literature, the date of the first tranche sale of each firm is considered the
date of eﬀective privatisation.
7International investors could buy a limited share of the equity, ranging from two to forty percent of sales.
8A contrary conclusion is reached by Kraft et al. (2006), with data from the Croatian banking sector,
showing that privatisations did not have an immediate eﬀect on improved eﬃciency.
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of banks (employers), public and private (domestic and foreign), meet each year to negotiate
the vertical collective bargaining agreement. This collective agreement, the most detailed
and extensive in Portugal, regulates the employability conditions, the remuneration and the
duration of work. In particular, it delimits the starting wage level and the compulsory wage
progressions for each of its 18 levels of the 4 groups defined to cover all the banking workforce.
Beyond this broad scope of the collective agreement, banking unions also enjoy the
strongest attachment in the economy. Indeed, the unionisation density has expandedmarkedly
between the periods 1974-78 and 1991-95, from 71% to 106% (Cerdeira, 1997).9 Despite this
notable reinforcement, unions did not act against privatisation. The resistance oﬀered was
very limited, not coordinated, and mostly being made through internal speeches which were
rarely reported in the national press. An interesting indicator of the tranquility is the total
absence of any strike action during the privatisation reform.10 However, unions improved
their relative negotiated wage growth during the privatisation period. Indeed, during the
period 1989-97, unions in the banking industry (rest of the economy) obtained an average
annual growth rate of negotiated wages of 7.7% (8.3%), while in the pre-reform period (1981-
88) they obtained 16.2% (17.4%).11 A priori, the coordinated bargaining system should bring
uniform wage levels across firms within the banking sector, although the positive diﬀeren-
tial between the wage defined by the collective agreement and the actually paid wage has
widened since the early nineties (Aperta et al., 1994).
In terms of labour outcomes, the main economic restructuring adjustments are illustrated
in Table 1.12 For comparison purposes, the public category refers to the two permanent public
banks, whereas the privatised category includes the ten firms being privatised. In contrast
to public firms, whose level of employment remained fairly constant from 1991 onwards,
the level of employment in privatised firms dropped steadily during the reform period. Each
privatised firm lost on average 732 employees between 1989 and 1997 (implying a 23 per cent
rate of overstaﬃng), which corresponds to a loss of 92 employees per firm/year during the
same period. Nevertheless, this downsizing of employment is accompanied by a significant
increase in the total working hours and in the share of permanent full time workers, more
notable in privatised than in public firms.13
9The unionisation density includes unionised, both active and retired, employees.
10Source: MSST, Greves Anual. Informação Estatística (Síntese), (various issues).
11Source: Own computations based on MSST, Relatórios e Análises, Regulamentação do Trabalho (various
issues) and on bargaining contract data supplied by Sindicato Bancário do Norte (1981-1997).
12Unit of currency = escudos (PTE). 1 Euro = 200.482 PTE
13In some cases, the corporate economic restructuring involves the adoption of less secure job (human
resource) practices, including either temporary or partial employment, in order to achieve more flexible
industrial relations. Cam (1999), for example, reports significant jumps in the number of temporary posts
6
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Table 1: Employment, wages and individual attributes during the privatisation period
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Average employment
Public 7 323 6 771 6 812 6 793 6 856
Privatised 3 884 3 733 3 663 3 425 3 152
Total working hours per month
Public 148.3 146.7 151.4 145.6 156.4
Privatised 148.3 145.4 154.9 146.2 158.2
Full time status %
Public 89.1 91.5 95.2 98.0 98.5
Privatised 83.3 98.5 96.3 98.4 98.7
Real hourly wage*
Public 1455
(686)
1702
(770)
1883
(985)
2007
(932)
1895
(790)
Privatised 1321
(524)
13992
(614)
1733
(1073)
1841
(967)
1855
(882)
Logarithm of real hourly wage*
Public 7.22
(.328)
7.37
(.372)
7.46
(.360)
7.54
(.326)
7.49
(.328)
Privatised 7.12
(.354)
7.23
(.361)
7.36
(.411)
7.44
(.365)
7.45
(.368)
Age**
Public 40.7 42.5 42.7 40.4 40.9
Privatised 40.7 41.9 42.8 43.3 43.7
Tenure**
Public 13.9 15.7 16.0 14.2 14.7
Privatised 14.0 15.2 16.0 17.0 17.5
Schooling**
Public 9.7 9.8 10.1 10.7 10.9
Privatised 9.2 9.2 9.3 10.7 10.6
Source: Own computations based on Quadros de Pessoal, MSST (1989-1997).
* Standard deviation in parentheses. ** Computed in years.
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The trend in the banking workers’ wages is also clear: both public and privatised firms’
workers experienced a strong (real) wage rise, mainly reflecting the fast economic growth ob-
served in the economy, after Portuguese membership of the European Community in 1986.
For privatised firms’ workers, however, the wage increase is clearly more pronounced than
for public employees. At first glance, this suggests a positive privatisation impact on the
wage level. Between 1989 and 1997, privatised employees enjoyed a wage increase of 40
percent whilst public employees enjoyed a wage gain of 30 percent.14 This convergence in
payment level is particularly notable as important dissimilarities in terms of human capi-
tal attainments, present already in 1989 (before privatisation), became more evident after
privatisation took place. Employees in privatised firms, even after the reform, are the least
educated, the oldest and the most experienced in the banking sector. On the other side, the
rise in the wage dispersion in privatised firms, when measured by the standard deviation of
hourly wage, may suggest heterogeneous privatisation wage impacts. Notice that this simple
analysis, besides not accounting for changes in the workforce composition, ignores the time
elapsed since the introduction of the reform in each firm, which possibly mitigates dynamic
privatisation eﬀects.
3 Econometric considerations
Assessing the impact of privatisation on wages of workers, whose firms’ ownership were
transferred from state to private hands, requires making an inference about the wages that
would have been observed had the privatisation program not been introduced. As one can
not observe the wage paid to each privatised firm’s employee in case the reform had not taken
place, the establishment of the casual eﬀect becomes a problem of inference with missing
data.
To be precise, let us state formally this causal eﬀect. Denote byWi1 andWi0 the wage paid
to an individual i (outcome or variable response) conditional on the presence and absence of
treatment (privatisation), respectively. Di is a participation variable that identifies whether
employee i received “treatment”, i.e., whether she was employed in a firm that was privatised
(Di = 1 ) or not (Di = 0). Finally, Xi represents, for each individual i, a set of attribute
variables, such as gender or age, that are unaﬀected by the treatment under study. The
missing data problem arises because it is impossible to form the impact of the policy for
any i0th individual, 4i = Wi1 −Wi0, as the observed wage for an employee i is given by
in the Turkish cement industry.
14The T-test for the estimated wage diﬀerence between the treatment and the control group is statistically
significant at the 1% level.
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Wi =Wi0+ Di (Wi1 −Wi0), with only one of Wi0 andWi1 being observed at any given point
in time.15 For all those individuals treated, one is interested in estimating the most common
parameter in the evaluation literature, E (Wi1 −Wi0|Di = 1, Xi) , also referred as the eﬀect
of the treatment on the treated.
In social experiments, the evaluation problem is in principle solved, by virtue of random
assignment to participation, which guarantees that the potential outcomes are independent of
the assignment mechanisms, and thenE (Wi0|Di = 1, Xi) =E (Wi0|Di = 0, Xi) . In contrast,
in observational studies, assignment is not random, resulting either from individual self-
sorting, selection made by a program manager, or both.
In matching, the fundamental assumption, Conditional IndependenceAssumption (CIA),
states that treatment assignment (Di), conditional on attributes (Xi), is independent of the
potential wages (Wi0,Wi1). In formal notation, this assumption corresponds to
(Wi0,Wi1) ⊥ Di | Xi, (1)
where ⊥ denotes independence.16 This means that, given Xi, one can use non-participants’
wages to approximate the (counterfactual) wage level of participants had they not partici-
pated. Hence, matching consists of finding, for each treated observation, a set of non-treated
observations with the same realisation of Xi. In the language of Heckman and Robb (1985),
matching assumes that selection occurs only on observables. Therefore, CIA excludes the
familiar dependence between outcomes and participation that is central to econometric mod-
els of self selection; there are no important variables, apart from Xi (on which the analyst
can not condition), that eﬀect both the non-treated outcome (Wi0) and the assignment (Di).
If this were the case, then selection would be on unobservables.
A practical implementation problem arises when the vector Xi is highly dimensional and
contains continuous variables. To circumvent this diﬃculty, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
show that matching on a scalar function of Xi, such as the propensity score, P (Xi) =
Pr (Di = 1|Xi) , is suﬃcient to balance the covariates Xi between the treatment and con-
trol units. Therefore, if CIA holds conditional on Xi, it will also hold conditional on the
propensity score,
(Wi0,Wi1) ⊥ Di | P (Xi) . (2)
15We are implicitly adopting the stable unit-treatment value assumption (SUTVA) first expressed by Rubin
(1980). This assumption requires that an individual’s potential outcome is independent of the treatment
status of other individuals, ruling out any eventual within-group or spillover (general equilibrium) eﬀect.
16“Ignorable treatment assignment”, in the terminology of Rubin (1977) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
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In this case, in order to have empirical content, matching also requires
0 < P (Xi) = Pr (Di = 1|Xi) < 1.17 (3)
To satisfy this condition, there must be both participants and non-participants for each
covariate of the vector Xi. Failure to satisfy this assumption restricts the analysis to the
region of support (all possible values of Xi) common to all treated and non-treated units,
and the estimated treatment eﬀect has to be redefined as the mean treatment eﬀect for those
treated falling within the common region of support.
By construction, matching eliminates two of the three selection bias sources identified by
Heckman et al. (1998): the bias resulting from having diﬀerent ranges of Xi for treated and
control samples, and the bias resulting from having diﬀerent distributions of Xi across their
common support. The remaining source of bias, diﬀerences on unobservables across groups,
are ruled out by the matching assumptions.
Under the matching assumptions, the eﬀect of treatment on treated is thus given by,
X
i∈D=1
ni
Ã
Yi1 −
X
j ∈D=0
NijYj0
!
, (4)
where Nij controls for the weight placed on each comparison observation j for individual i,
ni represents the eﬀective weight for the final treated sample, and Yi1 and Yj0 stand now for
a generic outcome, for the treatment and comparison groups, respectively.
A variety of diﬀerent matching schemes are possible. Each scheme involves the defini-
tion of a closeness criterion, a neighbourhood, and the selection of an appropriate weight
function to associate the set of non-treated observations to each participant. For instance,
the neighbourhood may range from a singleton set to a multiple set, eventually including
all non-treated observations.18 The choice relies on the trade-oﬀ between variance and bias
associated with each type of matching performed and the computational intensity allowed.
In general, increasing the neighbourhood (or bandwidth) to construct the counterfactual will
reduce the variance and increase the bias resulting from using, on average, more, but poorer,
matches. It will also rise the computational burden. For selecting the weight function, the
most common functions include the unity (equal) weight(s) to the nearest person(s) and
17This assumption together with CIA are the “strong ignorability treatment assignment conditions” in
the terminology of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
18See Heckman et al. (1999) and Smith and Todd (2005) for a detailed description of a variety of diﬀerent
matching estimators.
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zero to the others, and kernel weights, which downweight distant observations in terms of
the propensity score. Silverman (1986) clarifies several alternative kernel functions. A fi-
nal remark concerns matching with or without replacement, that is, using or not using the
same comparison unit repeatedly in forming the comparison group. Similarly, using more
than once the same non-treated unit may improve matching quality (reducing the bias), but
increase the variance.
In a repeated cross-section or panel context, it is still possible to implement another
version of the matching estimator, due to Heckman et al. (1997), called nonparametric con-
ditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences. It results from an extension of the conventional diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences (DiD) estimator by defining outcomes conditional on Xi and using non-(or
semi-)parametric methods to construct the diﬀerences. The critical identifying assumption,
the bias stability condition, using the terminology of Eichler and Lechner (2002), states that,
conditional on Xi, the biases are the same, on average, in diﬀerent time periods before and
after the implementation of the program, so that diﬀerencing the diﬀerences between treated
and non-treated units eliminates the bias. Let t and t0 denote, respectively, a point in time
after and before the program. The eﬀect of treatment on the treated is then identified if
E (W0t −W0t0|Xi, D = 1) = E (W0t −W0t0|Xi, D = 0) . Thus, the eﬀect of treatment under
the bias stability assumption is given by (4) for Yi1 = (Wi1t −Wi0t0) and Yj0 = (Wj0t −Wj0t0) .
Compared to the original matching estimator, this new version is more robust, since it
requires a weaker assumption that allows for an unobserved determinant of participation.
Hence, individuals’ participation may be based on their potential program outcomes as long
as the unobservability (individual and/or time-specific) rests on separable components of the
error term. Compared to pure DiD (Meyer, 1995), this estimator has the advantage of being
nonparametric, so that successful identification does not depend on specific functional forms
for the respective expectations.
4 Data and empirical specifications
The empirical part of this study relies on the Quadros de Pessoal (QP). This is a particularly
large and informative data set collected annually by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and
Solidarity since the early eighties. It consists of a matched employer-employee database
containing a high number of variables/concepts that meet international standards about
each unit, firm or employee, observed. For instance, for each firm the data gives the location,
level of employment, economic activity, type of management and total sales. Similarly, for
each employee, usual human capital variables, such as gender, level of schooling, tenure,
occupation, full-time/part-time status, earnings, length of working time and mechanisms
11
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of wage bargaining, among others, are provided. This valuable dataset also includes an
identification variable for either the firm or employee observed, which allows us to follow
each unit over time.
Before describing the methodology used in this study for creating the data sample and the
variables, let us state precisely the treatment eﬀect one is interested in, which will condition
the selection of treated and non-treated units. As the direct target of the privatisation
program is the firm itself and not the employees, one would ideally like to evaluate the
privatisation impact on those employees that either remained, joined or left the firm after
its privatisation.19 In this case, for the “joiner or leaver” employee, it would also be required
to know the reason for their moving in or out the firm, as the wage accepted by moving
individuals varies remarkably according to their employment status. This kind of information
is unfortunately unavailable in this dataset, which makes it diﬃcult to interpret the results
for these particular two groups. Further, if the employee became unemployed, self-employed
or employed by local/central authorities (civil servants), one will not know which, as these
organisations are not covered by this survey.
In order to avoid these potential problems, this study focuses only the eﬀect(s) of privati-
sation on the wages for those employees that remained in the same firm after its privatisation.
Therefore, our treated units (employees) correspond to all individuals that work in each pub-
lic firm subject to privatisation and retain their jobs after the implementation of the reform.
To be more precise, let t0 and t denote two points in time, representing respectively one
period before (pre-treatment) and one after (post-treatment) the privatisation of a given
public firm. Thus, the treated group includes all individuals that work both in t0 and t
for the firm being privatised. The corresponding control (non-treated) group is composed of
those workers employed in the remaining public firms (not subject to privatisation) and that,
similarly, kept their jobs between t0 and t. This choice allows us to match participants with
controls not only across certain observable characteristics, but also by pre-treatment public
employment status. Thus, we follow the spirit in the evaluation of active labour markets, in
which only individuals with common labour market histories (employment) are matched.20
More importantly, the selection of this particular control group enables us to bypass the self-
selection problem inherent in the classical selection model of Heckman (1979) in the context
of private and public sectors, and then fully justify the plausibility/adequacy of matching as-
19This contrasts with the active labour market policies, in which both the policy and evaluation object
targets coincide.
20Variables relating labour force status of treated individuals were found to be very significant (even more
than earnings) in explaining the participation decision in training programs.
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sumptions in the present evaluation. In fact, it has long been recognised that employment in
the public or private sector arises from an endogenous decision. Individuals sort themselves
in either sector according to their own (mostly unobserved) skills and preferences (in terms
of level of risk and complexity of the job, opportunity of internal promotion, quality of the
working conditions, etc.), making the public employees a non-random sample from the entire
labour force. Because we are using information from the remaining public employees within
the same industry for appraising the eﬀects of privatisation, this unobservable component,
responsible for the bias, is automatically controlled for. The remaining diﬀerences in terms
of observable attributes among the public employees will be eliminated by using matching
methods.
In addition, note that the purpose of the analysis is to compute the overall impact of
privatisation in the banking sector, not firm-by-firm eﬀects. Consequently, the ten firm
privatisations need to be condensed into one “single privatisation”. The creation of the
data sample for estimation is a two step procedure. In the first step, for each privatised
firm, we assign two points in time: one pre-treatment t0 and one post-treatment t. The
respective treated and non-treated individuals are then extracted. The choices of t0 and t
are driven by economic considerations. Because the firms’ process of restructuring occurred
mainly after the implementation of the reform, as referred to in Section 2, t0 consists of a
single calendar year prior to privatisation. In particular, the conventional procedure of the
privatisation literature is followed, considering the calendar year of each firm privatisation,
the year 0. Therefore t0 = −1, corresponds to the calendar year prior to each privatisation
date. In contrast, for the post-treatment period, we allow privatisation eﬀects to vary over
time, following the discussion of Gupta et al. (2001). The post-treatment period ranges
between one and four years, t = 1, 2, 3 and 4, corresponding either to one, two, three or
four calendar years after each privatisation date.21 The second step consists of aggregating,
in each t0 and t points in time, all treated and non-treated individuals of the respective
privatised firms, using a moving window, as shown in Kluve et al. (1999). As a result, all
individuals, excluding those from the permanent public firms, are considered non-treated
and treated at diﬀerent points in time.
The empirical analysis is based on prime-age individuals not yet subject to retirement.
Therefore, the sample is further restricted to individuals aged between 18 and 65 years ac-
cording to the definition of the vertical collective agreement prevailing in the industry. Apart
from these two requirements, only observations without complete demographic information
21This post-treatment period choice is also conditioned by the first merger wave in 1998 in the banking
industry, which involved recently privatised firms.
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in t0 and t, used for either the matching algorithm or the outcome equation, were dropped.
As the outcome variable, we use the logarithm of hourly wage, constructed as the log-
arithm of the sum of monthly base wage, plus the regular and irregular components of the
wage, payment indexed to tenure and overtime divided by normal and extra hours worked.
Hourly wage is preferable to monthly wage because workers from privatised and public firms
experienced diﬀerent length of working time during the reform. In addition, wages were
converted to real terms (1998 prices) using the Consumer Price Index (IPC). Table 2 and
3 display some selected characteristics of the treated and non-treated (potential control)
groups segmented by gender, suitable for matching in each time period.
Table 2: Mean attributes for the potential control and treated male groups in time t
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat.
Demographic variables*
Age 43.4 43.5 43.4 43.0 42.6 42.6 39.7 40.9
Tenure 16.6 16.6 17.2 16.3 16.6 15.9 12.9 14.5
Potential experience 27.6 28.3 27.7 27.8 26.6 27.3 23.5 25.6
Education 10.1 9.5 10.3 9.5 10.6 9.3 10.7 9.3
Total working hours per month 143.6 148.3 141.8 147.4 142.4 147.3 145.5 144.7
# months since last promotion 30.5 57.9 28.8 61.0 25.5 61.3 24.0 28.6
Full-time status (%) 96.7 84.9 93.0 81.9 91.0 81.3 94.0 69.1
Occupation (%)
High skilled 30.1 28.9 31.3 28.2 32.4 27.8 24.0 29.6
Low skilled 69.9 71.1 68.7 71.8 67.6 72.2 76.0 70.4
Region (%)
North 24.7 21.8 24.2 23.9 .2 23.6 - 7.5
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 70.4 76.3 65.5 76.1 89.4 76.4 96.1 92.5
Madeira and Azores 4.9 1.9 10.3 - 10.4 - 3.9 -
Real hourly wage**
t = −1 1750
(850)
1683
(869)
1720
(901)
1698
(879)
1774
(976)
1701
(895)
1610
(846)
1646
(1016)
t 1947
(992)
1752
(828)
1915
(1051)
1701
(733)
2040
(1113)
1783
(713)
1891
(1859)
2059
(990)
Logarithm of real hourly wage**
t = −1 7.40
(.345)
7.34
(.392)
7.38
(.338)
7.35
(.397)
7.41
(.351)
7.35
(.397)
7.32
(.333)
7.28
(.455)
t 7.50
(.361)
7.39
(.360)
7.48
(.361)
7.37
(.343)
7.54
(.367)
7.43
(.301)
7.49
(.300)
7.55
(.375)
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: * Computed at t = -1 for all samples. ** Standard deviation in parentheses.
When the time dimension is controlled for, a striking diﬀerence emerge. Considering men
(Table 2), the demographic variables indicate that the treated individuals have the same age
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and experience as the individuals in the control group, are less educated and work more
hours. Furthermore, the treated individuals enjoy on average a much longer period without
being promoted (5 years) and have a significantly lower fraction of full-time workers than
workers in public banks. The only exception is those employees who stay longer within
the firm, who tend to be older and more experienced, spend the same time working and
are promoted at the same pace as non-treated individuals. Occupational position within
the firm reflects diﬀerences in the educational level of workers. Therefore, there is a slightly
larger proportion of treated individuals in low skilled occupations. Once more, the exception
is those employees that remain the longest time within the firm, for whom occupational
position reflects seniority instead of educational level. The geographical distribution indicates
that the bulk of workers/firms is located in Lisbon. Finally, the diﬀerence in the payment
level before privatisations mainly reproduces diﬀerences in human capital attainment across
groups: privatised employees are paid a lower hourly wage than the group of potential
controls.
The corresponding figures for women (Table 3) show a very similar picture. Treated
women are again less educated, spend more time working, are promoted much less frequently
than non-treated women, and have a substantially lower fraction of full time employees. The
major diﬀerence is that treated women are slightly younger and less experienced than those
of the control group. The occupational distribution indicates that treated women have a
slightly lower share in the high-skill category. The exception occurs again for those women
who stay the longest time period within the firm. Regarding pay levels, the previous pattern
applies also for women, with treated women earning less than non-treated women.
The next issue concerns the selection of conditioning variables to be included in Xi in
order to estimate the propensity score. In the evaluation of the traditional active labour
market policies, the selection of variables in the participation equation is easily conducted
by the eligibility requirement rules of each program. In contrast, under the privatisation pro-
gram, firms, not workers, were selected to be privatised. As mentioned previously, this study
assumes that the firm’s performance is fully mirrored in the composition and observable
quality of the workforce, which is consistent with the well established public-private wage
diﬀerential literature (see, e.g., Katz and Krueger, 1991, and Disney and Gosling, 1998).22
Therefore, we include all time constant and time varying attributes of individuals that were
22We also tried to include the size of the firm (for the banking sector, this is the only available firm
characteristics variable in the data set) in order to control for observable selection of the firms being privatised.
Perhaps because all banks are similar in size (with the exception of one bank that is substantially larger than
the average), the overall impacts remained unaﬀected by the inclusion of this variable, aﬀecting (worsening)
only the quality of matching.
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Table 3: Mean attributes for the potential control and treated female groups in time t
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat. Cont. Treat.
Demographic variables*
Age 39.6 38.9 40.2 42.9 39.8 38.0 37.3 36.0
Tenure 14.1 12.9 15.4 15.4 15.7 12.5 12.4 10.8
Potential experience 24.2 23.9 25.2 23.6 24.3 22.8 21.6 20.8
Education 9.7 9.3 9.6 9.1 10.0 9.7 10.3 9.6
Total working hours per month 139.8 144.5 137.9 144.1 138.6 144.6 139.5 140.8
# months since last promotion 31.1 56.0 30.7 61.1 27.4 61.5 25.3 27.7
Full-time status (%) 90.3 80.0 86.2 77.2 85.1 77.5 86.7 60.2
Occupation (%)
High skilled 12.7 12.3 12.8 12.0 14.1 12.7 9.7 14.3
Low skilled 87.3 87.7 87.2 88.0 85.9 87.3 90.3 85.7
Region (%)
North 20.5 23.7 23.1 28.1 3.5 28.47 - 6.5
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 76.0 74.5 70.4 71.9 90.8 71.5 97.7 93.5
Madeira and Azores 3.5 1.9 6.5 - 5.7 - 2.3 -
Real hourly wage**
t = −1 1476
(618)
1326
(629)
1401
(572)
1347
(553)
1470
(574)
1384
(558)
1377
(513)
1280
(591)
t 1578
(822)
1388
(629)
1613
(1134)
1359
(480)
1717
(1274)
1474
(455)
1606
(584)
1629
(700)
Logarithm of real hourly wage**
t = −1 7.23
(.353)
7.12
(.353)
7.18
(.346)
7.14
(.358)
7.23
(.338)
7.17
(.346)
7.18
(.314)
7.08
(.370)
t 7.30
(.345)
7.18
(.320)
7.31
(.361)
7.16
(.309)
7.37
(.363)
7.26
(.260)
7.32
(.348)
7.34
(.322)
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: * Computed at t = -1 for all samples. ** Standard deviation in parentheses.
not aﬀected by the privatisation reform, such as, schooling, privatisation date, past expe-
rience, tenure, occupation and time elapsed since last promotion. For various reasons, the
following three variables were not included in our specifications: total working time, location
and full-time status. Total working time is our outcome variable, since we compute logarithm
of hourly wage, while location reflects the region where the head oﬃce of the bank is located
instead of the actual location of the bank or branch. The inclusion of the variable full-time
status violates the assumption (3), as we obtain perfect prediction of being employed in a
privatised firm, and destroys the balancing of the variables after matching.23
23We also tried diﬀerent specifications for the propensity score, including these and other variables, such
as the monthly wage before privatisation, as suggested by the work of Heckman et al. (1998). Once again,
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Table 4: Results from the participation probit for men and women when t = 1
Men Women
Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
Constant -.198 .317 -.328* .113
Tenure .002 .004 .025* .008
Tenure2 -.0003* .0001 -.002* .0002
Experience -.057* .006 -.044* .006
Experience2 .001* .00009 .001* .0001
Education vs less than 4 years of schooling
Primary (4) 1.582* .314 .524* .082
Preparatory (6) 1.659* .314 .690* .091
Lower secondary (9) 1.730* .314 .919* .092
Upper secondary (12) 1.210* .315 .545* .094
University (16) 1.342* .316 .519* .108
# months since last promotion .005* .0001 .006* .0002
Low skilled vs high skilled -.068* .017 -.144* .033
Privatisation date vs 1989
1991 -.863* .023 -.169* .032
1992 -1.221* .028 -.604* .040
1993 -.366* .030 .073** .044
1994 .054** .028 .495* .039
1996 -2.214* .034 -1.742* .049
LR chi-squared 13,373 .000b) 5,558 .000b)
Pseudo R2 .227 .224
Fraction correctly predicted (cutoﬀ=.5) 72.67 74.16
Sample size 44,024 19,957
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: *, ** and ***denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. b) P-value for the Likelihood ratio score
test for the null hypothesis that all right hand side variables have no eﬀect on privatisation.
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Table 4 reports the results of the probit regression for the propensity score correspondent
to equation (3) presented in the previous section. We estimate two propensity scores, for
men and women respectively, where the binary outcome takes the value 1 if the employee
works in a privatised firm when t = 1. In total, we estimate eight sets of scores, according
to each gender and period of time. Tables 9, 10 and 11 in the Appendix show the probit
estimates for t = 2, 3, and 4. Table 12 (also in the Appendix) summarises the propensity
score obtained for each treatment and control group, across gender and period of time.
The estimation results show, unsurprisingly, that for both genders the conditional par-
ticipation probability increases with tenure and declines slightly with potential experience
(age - schooling - 5). Employees with at least primary school have an increased probability
of working in privatised firms. In addition, male or female employees with 6 or 9 years of
schooling are clearly more likely to work in a privatised firm. The coeﬃcient estimates for
time elapsed since last promotion and occupation are in the expected direction, given the
diﬀerences observed in Table 2 and 3. Workers with longer periods of time without being
promoted and in low skilled occupations are also more likely to be employed by privatised
firms. The coeﬃcients on privatisation date reflect the proportion of employees in privatised
firms relative to the employees in the control firms. Hence, for both males and females, the
magnitude of the eﬀect of privatisation date is positive in 1994 given that in 1989 and 1994,
the largest banks in the industry were privatised.
For the actual matching, we also require, beyond the propensity score, that the pool of
potential controls, to which a given treated observation may be paired, belong to the same
year. We use the Mahalanobis metric for matching in these two variables. By matching
within the year we remove explicitly any time-specific unobservables not controlled for by
the propensity score, and avoid that each individual is matched with him(her)self. This is the
matching analogy to the fixed eﬀects. Also notice that including this variable (privatisation
date) both in the propensity score and as additional matching variable amounts to increasing
the weight of this variable when forming the matches.
5 Impact estimates
As discussed in Section 3, diﬀerent matching schemes generate diﬀerent estimates. This study
adopts two estimators which are extreme in terms of neighbourhood size.24 We adopt the
the magnitude of the impacts remains unaﬀected by the inclusion of these variables in the specification,
aﬀecting (worsening) only the quality of matching.
24The matching estimates were obtained using command psmatch2 in Stata, written by Leuven and Sianesi
(2003).
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nearest-neighbour matching estimator and the Gaussian kernel estimator, without imposing
any restriction in the region of common support.25 In terms of notation from equation (4), we
define Nij = 1 for the nearest-neighbour matching estimator, since each treated individual
is matched with the closest non-treated individual. For the Gaussian kernel estimator, the
outcome for each treated unit i is matched with a kernel-weighted average of outcomes for
all non-treated individuals, where the weight given to the non-treated unit j is in proportion
to the closeness, in terms of propensity score, between i and j. Formally, the outcome Yj0 is
weighted by Nij =
K
?pi−pj
h
?
?
j∈D=0
K
?pi−pj
h
? , where K(·) is based on the Gaussian distribution, p is the
propensity score and h is size of the neighborhood, i.e., the bandwidth. We chose h = .06.26
The overall eﬀect of privatisation in both cases is given by the arithmetic mean of all individ-
ual eﬀects and ni is thus given by the inverse of the sample size of the treated group. Overall,
matching with the nearest-neighbour or with the kernel estimators on the estimated propen-
sity score reduces substantially the variability in observable attributes, whether measured
by the median absolute bias or the pseudo R2 (see Table 13 in the Appendix).
Table 5 reports the impact of privatisation on the logarithm of hourly wage for men, over
four diﬀerent time periods, using four diﬀerent matching strategies. In the first two rows, we
present results from the nearest-neighbour and kernel matching estimators, implemented in
the context of cross-section samples. The privatisation eﬀects are estimated using equation
(4) for Yi1 =Wi1t and Yj0 =Wi0t. In the last two rows, these two same matching estimators
are reproduced under weaker assumptions, using longitudinal data. We estimate equation (4)
for Yi1 = (Wi1t −Wi0t0) and Yj0 = (Wj0t −Wj0t0) . We also present the estimates obtained
with a parametric diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator, using the same control group as in
Monteiro (2004). The pre-program period for each privatised firm is given by t = −1, while
the post-program period is given by t, ranging between one and four years. For example,
the figure -.064 (first row, first column) indicates that during the first year post-reform, the
wage paid to retained men in privatised firms grew 6.2 percent (e−.064−1) less than the wage
paid to their respective counterparts in public firms.
The overall picture depicted in Table 5 and 6, and Figure 1 and 2, confirms the dynamic
of the privatisation eﬀects formerly identified in Monteiro (2004). In fact, in contrast with
prior evidence, both tables and figures reveal that the privatisation eﬀects vary in sign and
magnitude according to the time of evaluation. Moreover, both figures seem to suggest
a positive relationship between time of restructuring and relative growth rate of wages.
25Table 12 in the Appendix shows that lack of common support is not an issue in the present evaluation.
26The results remain qualitatively unchanged if we adopt diﬀerent neighborhood sizes for each participant.
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Figure 1: The impact of privatisation on the hourly wage of men
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Figure 2: The impact of privatisation on the hourly wage of women
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Table 5: Matching estimates of the impact of privatisation on log hourly wage of men
Time eﬀect + 1 year + 2 years + 3 years + 4 years
Matching version
Cross section
1 NN −.064
∗∗
(.030)
−.065∗∗∗
(.040)
.033
(.045)
−.0004
(.009)
Kernel −.070
∗
(.025)
−.068∗∗∗
(.036)
.032
(.028)
.011∗∗∗
(.006)
Longitudinal
1 NN −.091
∗
(.026)
−.120∗
(.034)
.004
(.036)
.056∗
(.007)
Kernel −.105
∗
(.021)
−.111∗
(.030)
−.001
(.023)
.064∗
(.005)
Parametric Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences −.092
∗
(.003)
−.087∗
(.004)
−.056∗
(.004)
.043∗
(.007)
Treated sample size 17, 210 13, 912 12, 726 6, 801
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.*, ** and *** denote statistically significant from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
During the first two years after privatisation, both men and women suﬀer lower wage growth
rates, but this development tends to be reversed in the subsequent periods. Consequently,
this result supports the general objective of restructuring (cost reduction) implicit in the
implementation of the policy, and indirectly confirmed by Pinho (1999). As previously
referred, the Portuguese banking industry experienced a significant eﬃciency improvement
during the period 1988-97, particularly among the privatised institutions. Our short-term
wage eﬀects are therefore consistent with the findings of McGuckin and Nguyen (2001)
regarding the eﬀects of ownership changes in the US manufacturing sector: around 76% of
employees enjoyed lower wage growth rates after the ownership change. On the other hand,
deregulation of the product market — a related policy implemented in order to increase the
degree of product market competition — leads in general to declines in the wage growth rate.
For example, Black and Strahan (2001) find that, in the US banking industry, male wages
fell by 12.5 per cent.
Three years post-reform, the matching impacts of privatisation are mixed and insignifi-
cant, whereas, in the fourth year, retained employees are in advantage if longitudinal match-
ing estimates or previous results are considered. For this period of analysis, the results are
then consistent with those found by Parker and Martin (1996), despite the fact that their
analysis includes the entire workforce, regardless of gender. These authors find that four or
five years after privatisation, wages, on average, had increased (up to 8.4 percent) in 7 out
of 11 privatised firms in the UK, when compared to the whole economy.
These results seem to suggest a change in the pay policy of privatised firms. After firms
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Table 6: Matching estimates of the impact of privatisation on log hourly wage of women
Time eﬀect + 1 year + 2 years + 3 years + 4 years
Matching version
Cross section
1 NN −.081
∗
(.029)
−.028
(.036)
.051
(.042)
−.003
(.015)
Kernel −.083
∗
(.024)
−.037
(.032)
.048
(.034)
.003
(.010)
Longitudinal
1 NN −.118
∗
(.023)
−.108∗
(.033)
−.027
(.036)
.050∗
(.012)
Kernel −.121
∗
(.020)
−.101∗
(.028)
−.016
(.029)
.057∗
(.009)
Parametric Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences −.062
∗
(.004)
−.115∗
(.008)
−.056∗
(.006)
.043∗
(.007)
Treated sample size 6, 235 4, 967 4,486 2,151
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.*, ** and *** denote statistically significant from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
have completed the main adjustments, elimination of redundant workers — consistent with
figures on elapsed time since last promotion from Table 2 and 3 — and reduction of wage
growth, the remaining labour force is better rewarded. The rise in wage growth rates follow-
ing the adjustment period corresponds well with predictions from theoretical privatisation
models that include eﬀort or eﬃciency wages (Haskel and Sanchis, 1995, and Goerke, 1998).
Workers might have exerted a higher level of eﬀort, also acknowledged in the bargaining
contract, and thus increased productivity, as a response to increased fears of dismissal, given
the uncertainty caused by the reform.
A point worth noting concerns the performance of the four matching estimators imple-
mented. Both longitudinal matching estimators tend to overestimate the impact found by
the corresponding cross-sectional estimator, and the diﬀerence between the estimators in-
creases with time after the reform. Maybe the relatively small number of variables used in
this study, compared with the studies of evaluation of employment and training programs,
may explain the diﬀerent performance between cross-sectional and longitudinal estimators.
Alternatively, this diﬀerence may indicate the implausibility of the cross-sectional matching
assumptions for analysing long term eﬀects. Recall that in a pure random experiment dif-
ferent methodological strategies would yield similar results within each time period. Thus,
there might be some unobservable or observable variables, not accounted for, that are con-
taminating the results.
We turn now to the question of identifying sources of heterogeneity, other than gender
and timing, for which privatisation eﬀects are most prominent. Therefore, Table 7 and
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Table 8 report results obtained from the nearest neighbour diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences matching
estimator for men and women, respectively, for diﬀerent groups stratified according to age,
tenure, education, occupation and full-time status.
Table 7: The impacts of privatisation on the log hourly wage of men
DiD matching Time eﬀect + 1 year + 2 years + 3 years + 4 years
Age
[18− 30[ .030
(.029)
.009
(.046)
.027
(.057)
.089∗∗
(.037)
[30− 50[ −.084∗
(.022)
−.130∗
(.034)
.022
(.037)
.070∗
(.008)
[50− 65] −.124∗∗
(.062)
−.134∗∗∗
(.070)
−.093
(.073)
−.056∗∗
(.027)
Tenure
[0− 10[ −.026∗∗
(.011)
−.131∗
(.025)
.019
(.038)
.089∗
(.013)
[10− 20[ −.067∗∗∗
(.035)
−.109∗∗
(.045)
.065∗∗∗
(.049)
.074∗
(.011)
[20− [ −.138∗
(.046)
−.114∗∗
(.052)
.060
(.066)
−.013
(.018)
Education
[0− 6[ −.163∗
(.027)
−.138∗
(.029)
−.032
(.034)
−.0004
(.030)
[6− 16[ −.083∗
(.027)
−.121∗
(.035)
.020
(.041)
.069∗
(.008)
[16− [ −.164∗
(.037)
−.183∗
(.053)
−.118∗∗∗
(.068)
−.068∗∗
(.039)
Occupation
High skilled −.066
∗
(.020)
−.095∗
(.028)
−.053∗∗∗
(.041)
.006
(.015)
Low skilled −.106
∗
(.032)
−.121∗
(.041)
.036
(.048)
.090∗
(.009)
Treated sample size 17,210 13,912 12,726 6,801
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *,** and *** denote statistically significant from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
It turns out that assuming a single privatisation eﬀect per time period masks, to a
considerable extent, the variation of privatisation eﬀects. Nevertheless, although significant
diﬀerences across and within skill groups arise from these two tables, a fairly similar positive
trend can be detected for most skill groups, regardless of gender. Figure 3 helps to uncover
these trends.
Starting with age, the results indicate that privatisation penalised relatively more the
oldest employees of both genders. In fact, employees aged 50+ years experienced significant
wage losses during the first two years, clearly more pronounced than the average of the
respective gender group within each time period. This may not be particularly surprising,
as the workers in this age-group were relatively close to retirement. On the other hand,
whereas compulsory wage promotions are defined for the initial years of the career by the
wage agreement contract, these are optional for the latter years of the career and for the
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Figure 3: The impact of privatisation on the hourly wage by gender, across age, tenure,
education and occupational groups.
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Table 8: The impacts of privatisation on the log hourly wage of women
DiD matching Time eﬀect + 1 year + 2 years + 3 years + 4 years
Age
[18− 30[ −.013
(.026)
−.096∗
(.046)
−.061
(.068)
.100∗
(.035)
[30− 50[ −.121∗
(.029)
−.108∗
(.040)
−.037
(.041)
.038∗
(.013)
[50− 65] −.127∗
(.036)
−.155∗
(.048)
−.065
(.071)
−.067
(.085)
Tenure
[0− 10[ −.014
(.013)
−.140∗
(.029)
.009
(.031)
.118∗
(.020)
[10− 20[ −.144∗
(.037)
−.084∗∗∗
(.046)
−.025
(.055)
.025∗∗∗
(.019)
[20− [ −.156∗
(.049)
−.119∗∗∗
(.071)
−.024
(.080)
−.114∗
(.037)
Education
[0− 6[ −.155∗
(.022)
−.163∗
(.027)
.062∗∗∗
(.035)
.175∗
(.053)
[6− 16[ −.115∗
(.027)
−.133∗
(.035)
−.033
(.041)
.042∗
(.012)
[16− [ −.142∗∗
(.080)
−.117
(.118)
−.079
(.086)
−.004
(.064)
Occupation
High skilled −.108
∗
(.029)
−.217∗
(.045)
−.054
(.049)
−.006
(.035)
Low skilled −.125
∗
(.026)
−.117∗
(.037)
−.025
(.041)
.068∗
(.013)
Treated sample size 6,235 4,967 4,486 2,151
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *,** and *** denote statistically significant from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
highest paid occupations within the firm. Therefore, results suggest that firms cut wages for
the oldest individuals, while rewarding the youngest employees.
Evidence on tenure subgroups also reflects this restriction of the firms’ freedom to set
wages for certain experienced groups. Individuals who remained the longest time within the
firm suﬀered the highest wage losses over a longer time period, while the younger individuals
enjoyed the highest wage gains.
Looking at educational breakdowns, a surprising result is displayed. In contrast with our
expectation, the best educated male and female employees are the most negatively aﬀected
sub-groups in the workforce, suﬀering sharp and lasting reductions (which are never reversed)
in their relative wages, in particular after two years of the implementation of the reform.
A possible explanation for this finding might relate to the unknown size of the non-cash
component of compensation paid to this group. Given tax allowances, firms might have
preferred to reduce their relative wage and allow employees to still enjoy generous non-wage
compensation, such as free car. On the other hand, since banks incurred substantial expenses
in continuous job-training programs to update an old workforce, formal education might have
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become relatively less relevant in terms of pay policy.
Finally, in what concerns occupational sub-categories, both tables indicate that, during
the first two years, privatisation had a negative impact on relative wages for both low- and
high-skilled workers. Yet, in contrast with the low-skilled category, the high-skilled workers
never enjoyed a relative wage increase. Hence, despite the broad concept of managers used
here, this result seems to contradict the positive prediction (from a variety of theories) of
the impacts of privatisation on CEO pay levels.27 The reason for this finding is likely to
be related to the downsizing strategy of privatised firms, possibly implying a lower level of
supervision and responsibilities for employees in this occupational category.
6 Concluding Remarks
The causal eﬀect of privatisation on wages remains an important and controversial topic
among policy-makers and economists alike. The frequent opposition from public opinion
and trade unions towards privatisation programs makes this particular topic a challenging
issue for policy makers. The resistance usually arises from the fear of adverse labour strate-
gies, including either displacement or wage reductions. For economists, on the other hand,
the topic creates additional interest, for at least two diﬀerent reasons. First, diﬀerent theo-
retical approaches produce ambiguous predictions regarding the wage eﬀects of privatisation.
Second, there is the habitual missing data problem inherent in the evaluation of causal eﬀects
in observational studies. In contrast with active labour market policies, though, privatisation
has not been the target of a lively discussion from an evaluation standpoint, and therefore
deserves further scrutiny.
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the eﬀects of privatisation on wages in
the Portuguese banking industry. In particular, we were interested in testing if earlier findings
on privatisation wage eﬀects (Monteiro, 2004) are robust to the selection of methodology.
Following earlier analysis, we focus on the eﬀects of privatisation on employees who remained
within the firm after the reform, by comparing wages of those employees with employees in
public firms. We have done this by implementing two variants of matching estimators in two
diﬀerent contexts: cross-sectional and longitudinal samples.
In general, the results point to an overall confirmation of previous findings. Indeed, our
results, obtained from Quadros de Pessoal for the period between 1989 and 1997, generally
show a negative (positive) short-run (long-run) eﬀect of privatisation on relative wage growth
for both men and women retained in the privatised firms. When the wage eﬀects are broken
27See Rosen (1992) or Wolfram (1998) for a theoretical and empirical survey on executive pay levels.
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down to account for the heterogeneity of the eﬀects, a persistent positive pattern prevails,
irrespective of gender. The evidence provided here also shows that the restructuring process
hit more intensively the most educated employees. This surprising result, which contrasts
with the conventional wisdom from the public/private wage literature, may also imply that,
rather than education, seniority and experience still count for much in this particular labour
market.
Our results have at least two important policy implications. First, privatisation seems
to be a gender neutral policy, given the similarity of the eﬀects by gender, both in terms of
trend and intensity. Thus, our results appear to contradict Gary Becker’s prediction about
the relationship between market structure and discrimination. Nevertheless, more research
is clearly needed to assess if privatisation aﬀects men and women diﬀerently. Second, the
evidence presented so far also shows that the fear of wage cuts following privatisation — as is
often argued by labour unions — seems to be unfounded. Indeed, wage losses — if they occur
— are only temporary, as the long-term dynamics seem to confirm the law of one price in the
labour market.
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Appendix
Table 9: Results from the participation probit for men and women when t = 2
Men Women
Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
Constant .288 .454 .087 .144
Tenure .011 .006 .027* .010
Tenure2 -.001* .0001 -.002* .0003
Experience -.073* .008 -.053* .008
Experience2 .001* .0001 .001* .0001
Education vs less than 4 years of schooling
Primary (4) 2.297* .449 .646* .103
Preparatory (6) 2.495* .449 .987* .117
Lower secondary (9) 2.642* .449 1.383* .119
Upper secondary (12) 1.867* .449 .903* .121
University (16) 2.130* .451 1.002* .143
# months since last promotion .007* .0002 .008* .0003
Low skilled vs high skilled -.109* .022 -.163* .043
Privatisation date vs 1989
1991 -1.692* .043 -.759* .043
1992 -1.782* .047 -.814* .052
1993 -1.560* .046 -.747* .051
1994 -.991* .045 .122* .049
LR chi-squared 6,439 .000b) 2,494 .000b)
Pseudo R2 .209 .178
Fraction correctly predicted (cutoﬀ=.5) 70.50 68.32
Sample size 22,994 10,110
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: *, ** and ***denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. b) P-value for the Likelihood ratio score
test for the null hypothesis that all right hand side variables have no eﬀect on privatisation.
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Table 10: Results from the participation probit for men and women when t = 3
Men Women
Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
Constant .177 .519 .098 .177
Tenure .044* .008 .050* .011
Tenure2 -.002* .0002 -.004* .0003
Experience -.083* .001 -.045* .011
Experience2 .002* .0001 .001* .0001
Education vs less than 4 years of schooling
Primary (4) 2.476* .513 .355 .137
Preparatory (6) 2.926* .513 .933* .150
Lower secondary (9) 3.093* .513 1.502* .153
Upper secondary (12) 2.216* .513 .922* .155
University (16) 2.578* .516 1.119* .176
# months since last promotion .010* .0003 .010* .0004
Low skilled vs high skilled -.131* .027 -.179* .047
Privatisation date vs 1989
1991 -1.629* .063 -.586* .056
1992 -2.282* .065 -1.148* .058
1993 -1.884* .065 -.849* .058
1994 -1.582* .064 -.411* .056
LR chi-squared 5,777 .000b) 2,642 .000b)
Pseudo R2 .252 .234
Fraction correctly predicted (cutoﬀ=.5) 76.71 73.81
Sample size 18,492 8,189
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: *, ** and ***denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. b) P-value for the Likelihood ratio score
test for the null hypothesis that all right hand side variables have no eﬀect on privatisation.
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Table 11: Results from the participation probit for men and women when t = 4
Men Women
Coeﬃcient Std. error Coeﬃcient Std. error
Constant -5.514 - .986* .217
Tenure .074* .007 .082* .012
Tenure2 -.002* .0002 -.004* .0004
Experience -.107* .009 -.102* .012
Experience2 .002* .0001 .002* .0002
Education vs less than 4 years of schooling
Primary (4) 6.125* .108 -.352*** .186
Preparatory (6) 6.533* .102 -.247 .193
Lower secondary (9) 6.453* .096 .032 .197
Upper secondary (12) 5.796* .089 -.508** .198
University (16) 5.743* .094 -.899* .215
# months since last promotion .006* .0005 .003* .0007
Low skilled vs high skilled -.316* .028 -.553* .054
Privatisation date vs 1989
1991 .729* .027 .630* .043
1992 .273* .033 .302* .048
1993 -.183* .039 -.477* .068
LR chi-squared 2,426 .000b) 970 .000b)
Pseudo R2 .121 .113
Fraction correctly predicted (cutoﬀ=.5) 68.10 72.63
Sample size 14,490 6,965
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1989-1997).
Notes: *, ** and ***denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. b) P-value for the Likelihood ratio score
test for the null hypothesis that all right hand side variables have no eﬀect on privatisation.
33
Page 33 of 35
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table 12: Propensity scores by time and gender
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
t = 1 Men
Privatised .5537567 .2340450 .0131557 .9887109
Public .2869447 .2071896 .0018966 .9815215
Women
Privatised .4816485 .220088 .0129936 .9554378
Public .2371310 .1924759 .0006537 .9402833
t = 2 Men
Privatised .6999680 .2265299 .1025044 .9988026
Public .4588628 .1831909 .0026444 .9919025
Women
Privatised .6045986 .2280892 .0085209 .9891979
Public .3841890 .1891185 .0166561 .9756401
t = 3 Men
Privatised .7728200 .2070783 .0657026 .9999654
Public .4998144 .2015494 .0018765 .9998800
Women
Privatised .6755556 .227302 .0376332 .9970115
Public .3934719 .2194256 .0055463 .9912833
t = 4 Men
Privatised .5536247 .1905893 .0830682 .9645761
Public .3953927 .1732543 6.07e-12 .9202089
Women
Privatised .3995526 .1598363 .0147413 .8847555
Public .2674113 .1518061 .0007223 .8765878
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Table 13: Indicators of covariate balancing, before and after matching, by time and gender
Probit ps.- R2
before
Probit ps.- R2
after
Pr >χ2
after
Median absol.
bias before
Median absol.
bias after
t=1 Men 1NN .227 .010 .000 12.032 2.923
Kernel .227 .014 .000 12.032 2.728
Women 1NN .224 .007 .000 14.083 1.434
Kernel .224 .004 .000 14.083 1.694
t=2 Men 1NN .209 .025 .000 13.107 .3.673
Kernel .209 .027 .000 13.107 6.220
Women 1NN .178 .009 .000 24.137 6.244
Kernel .178 .007 .000 24.137 2.834
t=3 Men 1NN .252 .042 .000 13.152 8.157
Kernel .252 .047 .000 13.152 4.385
Women 1NN .234 .018 .000 32.547 6.717
Kernel .234 .011 .000 32.547 4.454
t=4 Men 1NN .121 .003 .000 21.094 2.788
Kernel .121 .002 .000 21.094 2.327
Women 1NN .113 .003 .184 12.241 1.376
Kernel .113 .004 .077 12.241 2.333
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